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ABSTRACT
The C-DAX project aims at providing a secure overlay net-
work, as an overlay over an IP network, that provides an
information-centric network (ICN) tailored to the needs and
the capabilities of smart grids. This paper addresses how
end-to-end security can be enforced in information-centric
networks by proposing a protocol based on the concept of
identity-based encryption, a type of public-key cryptogra-
phy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The EU FP7 project C-DAX (Cyber-secure Data and Con-
trol Cloud)1 investigates an information sharing solution for
the monitoring and control of smart grids based on an infor-
mation-centric networking (ICN) solution as an overlay of
IP. The C-DAX solution will provide a distributed data-cloud
tailored to the specific needs of smart grids. In particular,
it is intended to efficiently support the massive integration
of renewables and be able to cope with a heterogeneous set
of co-existing smart grid applications, running on devices
and communicating over networks with widely varying ca-
pabilities when it comes to communication and computation
speeds. Precursors to the C-DAX solution are overlay net-
working solutions developed at Bell-Labs [10, 11] (originally
called SeDAX).
The general requirements of C-DAX cover fundamental
system requirements that are required for the basic oper-
ation of the platform, such as configuration, communica-
tion, data management and security. Further, additional
requirements are considered in C-DAX by considering three
representative use cases. The first two use cases focus on
the communication and control of measurement devices in
the field. The first use case considers RTUs (Remote Ter-
minal Units) and IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices) com-
municating with the Distribution Control Center (DCC).
The second use case considers the communication between
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PMUs (Phasor Measurement Units) dispersed in the elec-
tricity system and PDCs (Phasor Data Concentrators), state
estimator units, and SCADA systems. The third use case
considers the future retail energy market and the commu-
nications needs for negotiations between consumers, owners
of the distributed generation units (say solar power stations
and wind turbines), and possible intermediaries.
These use cases have a different number of parties involved
in the communication (e.g., many PMUs and a few PDCs;
many home meters and a few energy providers) and rely on
different network topologies with different data rates (e.g.,
power line communication, optical fibre, etc.). One feature
common to all use cases is that the messages being commu-
nicated are relatively small (especially when compared to
ICN solutions for, say, distributing video content), although
the volume of messages may be large. More information
about the use cases is available in [15].
This document first sketches the basic ideas behind the
C-DAX solution and considers the general security issues un-
derlying communication models based on information-centric
principle (in particular the one adopted in C-DAX) in the re-
mainder of Section 1. It then proposes a security solution to
enforce end-to-end security between smart grid applications
running as C-DAX clients.
1.1 Information-Centric Networks and C-DAX
What is ICN?.
Whereas traditional networking solutions aim at providing
point-to-point connections between locations, in an informa-
tion-centric network (a.k.a. content-centric network) [1, 12]
the content plays a central role, rather than the location
where this content happens to be stored, its origin, or is des-
tination. Hence, communication primitives do not involve
naming schemes for the identities of senders and receivers,
but rather a naming schemes for the content.
The main advantage of such a solution is that it provides
more flexibility than traditional, host-centric solutions, es-
pecially when there are many parties exchanging and shar-
ing information. Communication may not only be one-to-
one, but can also be many-to-one, one-to-many, or many-
to-many. ICN also has some inherent security advantages,
discussed in more detail below.
The C-DAX platform.
Conceptually, one can see the C-DAX overlay as a dis-
tributed information-centric network. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
the C-DAX platform consists of two major components: the
Figure 1: C-DAX architecture
C-DAX middleware that provides publisher-subscriber inter-
faces to clients hosting smart grid applications and the C-
DAX cloud which consists of logically interconnected C-DAX
nodes which are responsible for the resolution and delivery of
messages exchanged between publishers and subscribers in a
resilient, self-configurable, and scalable manner. The main
idea of C-DAX is that, instead of applying host-centric and
point-to-point communication, it supports group communi-
cation that is data-centric (i.e., its concepts are developed
around the data being communicated) and topic-based (as
the routing of data is based on topic identifiers).
Information is organised in so-called topics (i.e., elements
of information sufficiently characterising data units easily
identifiable by the clients) which are uniquely identified by
a name and stored on certain C-DAX nodes. A publisher gen-
erates information for a specific topic (i.e., topic-data) and
sends it to the C-DAX cloud. Subscribers can express inter-
est in a specific topic and subscribe to information about it.
C-DAX nodes are hosts geographically distributed in the C-
DAX cloud that cache/store the published data and forward
it to the interested subscribers. Topic-data is distributed
over C-DAX nodes and possibly replicated at different loca-
tions. Neighbouring C-DAX nodes in the overlay can forward
information to each other.
Simply put, one can think of the C-DAX overlay as a bul-
letin board, or a collection of bulletin boards, where clients
can publish information on certain topics or subscribe to re-
ceive information on certain topics, in the style of the pub-
lish/subscribe paradigm [5]. However, the data is not in
one location but is physically distributed over many places
– over the cloud of C-DAX nodes – but in manner that is
transparent to the clients.
Amongst all the requirements identified for the C-DAX
platform, it must support confidentiality, integrity and au-
thenticity of communication messages in an end-to-end and
scalable manner. Accessing computation resources or data
needs to be strictly controlled in a fine-grained way. The sys-
tem must be protected against accidental failures or inten-
tional cyber-threats such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
and malware intrusion.
1.2 Security issues in ICN
An inherent security advantage of solutions such as the
one adopted in C-DAX is that the clients of the C-DAX cloud
– i.e., the senders and receivers of data – need not know
each others IP addresses. This decoupling of senders and
receivers reduces the risk of network-borne attacks. This is
especially relevant as these clients are often machines with
limited capabilities, such as measurements devices in the
field or home meters, which do not have many resources to
withstand attacks. Another advantage is that to improve
availability in the case of failures (i.e., resilience), the C-
DAX cloud can replicate data on different nodes placed at
different locations, without clients having to be aware of
this.
There are some subtle differences between securing tradi-
tional point-to-point communications and securing an infor-
mation-centric networking solution like C-DAX.
For point-to-point communication there are standard se-
curity solutions such as TLS/SSL or IPSec. These typi-
cally involve the use of short-term symmetric session keys
exchanged by means of longer-term asymmetric keys, com-
bining the advantages of fast symmetric crypto with the
convenience of key management of – slower but more flex-
ible – asymmetric crypto. Moreover, as communications
in information-centric networks typically involve more than
two parties, sharing of symmetric keys has bigger security
impact, as the group of parties sharing the key is larger.
Another difference is that in point-to-point communica-
tion we want to secure a stream of information (or two
streams, one in each direction), whereas in an information-
centric network we have to secure individual messages. Stan-
dard solutions to secure data streams provide a standard
notion of session integrity and confidentiality. This means
that integrity of the order of messages in the stream is auto-
matically guaranteed; changing the order of message in the
stream, or replaying them, will be detected. When securing
individual messages in an ICN solution we do not get these
properties for free, but sequence numbers or time stamps
have to be included to guarantee freshness of messages and
the integrity of order of messages. Indeed, with two parties
publishing data on the same topic, there is a difference be-
tween integrity of the sequences of messages each individual
publisher publishes, and integrity of the interleaving; the for-
mer can be guaranteed by sequence numbers per publisher,
but the latter cannot.
So, as we will detail further in this document (Section 2),
for an information-centric solution we cannot rely on stan-
dard security solutions such as TLS/SSL, but we have to
come up with a scheme for signing and encrypting data to
ensure integrity and confidentiality. On the positive side,
any such security solution for an information-centric net-
work will secure content rather than connections, and hence
naturally provides the end-to-end security, as advocated in
smart grid standards such as IEC 62351 [21].
2. REASONING ABOUT SECURITY SOLU-
TIONS FOR ICN
2.1 Content-based security
In standard communication models (i.e., host-to-host com-
munication) trust in the content is intrinsically tied to the
trust in the host where the information comes from and how
the content was retrieved. As stated before, the assurance
that the data came from the intended source and was not
tampered with neither eavesdropped during the transmis-
sion, is given by standard cryptographic protocols such as
TLS/SSL or IPsec.
ICN decouples where of the information comes from, from
what type of content one wants to retrieve. Hence, security
constructions to authenticate the content itself are much
more relevant than schemes that can only be used to au-
thenticate its source. Content-based security (as opposed to
connection-based security) must then allow the users to re-
trieve and authenticate the information regardless of know-
ing where it comes from and how it is transported.
In the specific context of C-DAX, information has to be
sent through the C-DAX cloud: publishers send topic-data
to the cloud that will be forwarded (by the cloud) to the in-
tended subscribers. Subscribers must be able to validate
that topic-data actually originates from valid publishers,
but they do not need to know publisher’s location/identity.
Moreover, the trust placed in the C-DAX cloud has to be
as minimal as possible, i.e., subscribers must be able to au-
thenticate the content without placing any trust in the cloud.
More concretely, a C-DAX client must be able to verify the
authenticity of the data received, irrespective of how the in-
formation is forwarded or retrieved. It is then imperative to
reason about different solutions that can be used to secure
information-centric communication models such as the one
adopted in C-DAX.
2.2 Why do standard crypto protocols not suf-
fice?
As in C-DAX, in the new generation of smart grid net-
works a massive generation of data is expected from different
measuring devices. For instance, the future power grid will
support advanced monitoring infrastructures (e.g., advanced
phasor measurement units) that will be able to provide real-
time information to the SCADA system to develop a new
class of optimal control functions.
Trying to adapt the standard cryptographic protocols to
enforce end-to-end security between C-DAX clients has sev-
eral implications. First of all, a pertinent observation is
that C-DAX supports (beside one-to-one) one-to-many and
many-to-many communication types whereas standard pro-
tocols are designed to establish a secure session between two
end-points. Although, solutions have already been proposed
in the literature to extend these protocols to multicast group
communication (e.g., standard RFC 5374 on Multicast Ex-
tensions to the Security Architecture for the Internet Proto-
col), such solutions do not scale when considering commu-
nications between many-to-many end-points, specially when
very high data rates with very low latency is expected, as
is the case in C-DAX (e.g., the second use case considered
in C-DAX involves PMUs to provide real-time estimations
of the state of the grid; here data throughput is extremely
high and the allowed time delays are extremely small).
For instance, extending TLS to secure group communica-
tion (in C-DAX), would imply either establishing as many
sessions as the number of the recipients or creating a group
session key. Establishing a unique session with each recip-
ient seems a more appropriate solution (as single keys im-
ply weaker security guarantees); however, the number of en-
cryptions of the same data (a.k.a. ciphertexts) needed, then
grows linearly with the number of recipients. Moreover, us-
ing TLS for group communication (and additional multicast
extensions) requires interactive communication between the
end-points (i.e., publishers and subscribers) and does not
provide natural support for public verifiability (e.g., if au-
thentication in the cloud is crypto-based – signature or mes-
sage authentication code – it is not straightforward how the
C-DAX cloud itself can actually authenticate topic-data to
filter out malicious traffic; notice that the cloud cannot de-
crypt and then re-encrypt topic-data, otherwise end-to-end
security would be compromised).
Another important aspect is that standard protocols usu-
ally rely on public-key cryptography, which in turn relies
on the use of PKI certificates to distribute and check pub-
lic keys. These certificates can be either stored at the de-
vices or sent at beginning of the communication. Storing
a huge amount of certificates (or just even the associated
public keys) has a big impact on scalability. On the other
hand, certificate transmission over limited bandwidth com-
munication lines (e.g., power line communication) may be
impractical.
Summing up, standard protocols were not originally de-
signed to enforce end-to-end security in communication mod-
els like the one adopted in C-DAX, so we have to consider
new protocols for this.
2.3 Possible security solutions
We reason about different possible solutions to enforce
end-to-end security between publishers and subscribers in
C-DAX.
Symmetric keys per topic.
A very simple solution is to use symmetric keys per topic:
all the clients that publish or subscribe to information on a
specific topic have to hold the corresponding key. (Different
keys could be used for generating message authentication
codes and for the encryption/decryption). This solution is
adopted in the SSTP protocol proposed by Bell-Labs to se-
cure smart grid networks [8]. Although this solution is very
efficient, clearly it gives low security guarantees. For in-
stance, whenever one client is compromised all the past and
future communications are also compromised. Moreover, if
no access control policies are being enforced (for dedicated
networks it might be case, e.g., dedicated networks within
the substations) both publishers and subscribers can publish
and subscribe and there is no way to detect if it was a valid
publisher that actually published the information or not.
A more elaborated solution is to use diversified symmet-
ric keys: a trustworthy third party generates a (symmetric)
master key per topic and derives several symmetric keys
from that key for each publisher and the master key is given
to the subscribers. This solution is actually adopted in the
REMP protocol, also proposed by Bell-Labs [9]. Section 7
provides a more detailed overview of the REMP protocol.
Although a solution adopting diversified symmetric keys of-
fers better security guarantees than just using a symmetric
key per topic, it requires that subscribers are trustworthy
entities (i.e., they will not use the master key to publish
illegitimate topic-data on behalf of some publisher), which
might not be the case, for instance in the retail energy mar-
ket, where the type of clients varies from energy consumers
to external companies providing different types of services
(e.g., providing smartphone applications to manage home
meters measurements).
Asymmetric keys per client.
Assuming that asymmetric (long-term) keys are given to
each client and are assigned to their identity, a valid solution
is to use them to enforce end-to-end security between C-DAX
clients. In this solution, publishers encrypt topic-data with
the subscribers public key and sign it with their own private
key. Subscribers decrypt with their own secret key and verify
with the public key of the publisher.
Naturally this approach presents some disadvantages: (1)
publishers have to store all the public keys of subscribers;
and (2) have to create as many encryptions of the same
message as the number of subscribers, which introduces a
huge overhead in the system performance. Besides, it com-
pletely neglects the advantage of information-centric net-
works, where publishers and subscribers do not have to know
each other to be able to communicate.
Asymmetric keys per topic.
Adopting asymmetric keys per topic seems to be a better
approach. Two pairs of public/secret keys are assigned to
each topic. Each client holds a pair of public/private keys
(PK,SK): Publishers have the encryption public key PKe
and the signing private key SKs of the topic, and subscribers
the corresponding encryption secret key SKe and signing
public key PKs. Although a fine grained access control can
then be ensured by the key distribution, this solution im-
plies storing as many key pairs as the number of topics that
a client publishes on or subscribes to. Besides, if content
authentication based on signatures is not just done by the
clients that are the end-recipients of this content, but is al-
ready done in the cloud by the nodes handling this data,
this requires storing all the signing public keys PKs for all
existent topics, in all C-DAX nodes. If public keys are at-
tached to certificates and the number of topics is extremely
high, the space required to store all the certificates, which
will increase linearly in the number of topics, will be large.
In this paper, we propose a different solution based on as-
signing asymmetric keys per topic, but where the storage
space required is minimal.
Contributions.
As previously stressed, current cryptographic protocols
do not directly target data-centric communication architec-
tures: decoupling location from identity imposes significant
challenges to actually authenticate the content itself. Our
effort in this paper is to contribute to this area, by adapt-
ing existing identity-based cryptographic schemes to provide
end-to-end security between publishers and subscribers in
the C-DAX overlay network. We introduce the notion of
content-based signcryption (CBS) based on the concept of
identity-based signcryption, and we propose a CBS scheme
for information-centric based networks, by relying on two ex-
isting identity-based schemes for encryption and signatures.
Paper organisation.
Section 3 introduces the concepts of identity-based sign-
cryption and content-based signcryption. Section 4 proposes
an efficient scheme and how it can be applied to C-DAX.
Then Section 5 reasons about its security and Section 6 eval-
uates the proposed scheme in terms of performance. Finally,
Section 7 describes related work available in the literature
and Section 8 concludes and presents directions for future
work.
3. DEFINITIONS
3.1 Identity-based signcryption
The concept of identity-based signcryption (IBS) was in-
troduced by Malone-Lee [14] and combines the notions of
identity-based encryption and signcryption.
Signcryption was introduced by Zheng [24] in 1997; the
idea is to combine the functionality of encryption and sig-
nature schemes in a single one, in a more efficient way.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is an asymmetric encryp-
tion scheme where existing identifiers for entities in a system
(e.g., email addresses or telephone numbers) are reused in
the construction of public keys. The idea is that this avoids
the need for certificates, as clients can use identifiers that
they already know as public keys. This is an advantage
for devices with limited storage space and communication
links with limited bandwidth (as is the case for parts of the
smart grid infrastructure), because there is no need to ex-
change and validate the certificates. All this does require a
trusted authority, usually known as the private key generator
(PKG), to issue all secret keys and some system parameters.
The concept of IBE was introduced by Shamir [19] in 1984
but the first practical implementation was only proposed in
2001 by Boneh and Franklin [3].
Usually, IBE protocols are based on pairings (i.e., special
bilinear maps defined over mathematical groups) and secu-
rity relies on the hardness of solving mathematical problems
such as the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP). These
concepts are introduced in Section 4.
3.2 Content-based signcryption
In order to try to tackle some of the problems identified
in the solutions previously described, we propose a content-
based signcryption (CBS) scheme for information-centric com-
munication models derived from the original IBS scheme in-
troduced by Malone-Lee [14]. As in the original scheme the
secret keys are generated by a trusted third party, the so-
called private key generator (PKG), and tied to the global
system parameters.
The CBS scheme consists of four algorithms: the first al-
gorithm is executed at the system setup (by the PKG) and
derives the systems parameters (public and private param-
eters); the second algorithm is used to derived secret keys
per topic-group, being executed every time a new topic is
added to the system; and the third and fourth algorithms
are used to publish and subscribe topic-data, respectively.
1. Setup. This takes as input a security parameter η and
derives the public parameters of the system, as well
as two different master secret keys: one for encryp-
tion/signing MSKs (the master secret key for encryp-
tion & signing) and another for decryption/verification
MSKd (the master secret key for decryption & signa-
ture verification). Each master secret key is associated
to a (corresponding) master public key. The public
parameters include the definitions of the message and
ciphertext space, and public master keys. The PKG
runs the setup algorithm, but does not reveal the mas-
ter secret keys.
2. Key extraction. This takes as input a topic identifier ID
(a bit-string used as a public key), the public param-
eters (generated in the setup) and the master secret
keys. Derives an encryption-signing secret key associ-
ated to ID from MSKs and a decryption-verification
secret key (also associated to ID) derived from MSKd.
Each topic has a public key (the identifier ID) and two
secret keys: one for encryption-signing SKs and an-
other for decryption-verification SKd.
3. Signcrypt. This takes as input the topic identifier ID,
the encryption-signing secret key SKs associated to
ID, the public parameters and a message, and out-
puts the ciphertext encrypted and signed with the pair
(ID,SKs).
4. Unsigncrypt. This takes as input the decryption-veri-
fication secret key SKd, the topic identifier ID, the
public parameters and the ciphertext (including the
signature). If the signature verifies, then it decrypts
and outputs the message, otherwise an error value ⊥
is output.
For consistency it is required that:
if signcrypt(m, ID, SKs) = C
then unsigncrypt(C, ID, SKd) = m.
Realising CBS in C-DAX .
To apply the CBS described above to C-DAX we need a
trusted third party to play the role of PKG. As it is shown in
Figure 22, there is a security server performing this function,
i.e. generating the system parameters and issuing the secret
keys of the C-DAX clients.
At the system setup, the security server generates the pub-
lic parameters and the master secret keys. Afterwards, for
each topic identifier it derives an encryption-signing secret
key SKs and decryption-verification secret key SKd. Every
publisher that is allowed to publish information on a certain
topic gets the corresponding SKs from the security server,
and every subscribers that is allowed to subscribe to infor-
mation on a topic gets SKd. All system entities can get the
public parameters from the security server.
To publish data in the C-DAX cloud, each publisher has to
encrypt and sign the message with SKs. On receiving data
from the cloud, the subscriber can decrypt and verify it using
SKd. In short, for each topic the security server derives the
triple (ID, SKs, SKd), but clients involved in the communi-
cation, i.e., publishers and subscribers, only have access to
2For simplicity, we abstract publishers/subscribers and C-
DAX nodes as single entities.
a single pair (ID,SK), where SK = SKs for publishers and
SK = SKd for subscribers. The cloud itself (or any other
entity than the security server, with no permission either
to publish/subscribe) never gets access to the secret keys of
the topic, otherwise, end-to-end security between publishers
and subscribers could be compromised.
Remarks.
As CBS schemes are based on identity-based cryptogra-
phy, they do not require certificates to authenticate public
keys: the public key is the topic-name itself and all the C-
DAX nodes and clients can have access to it.
Another interesting aspect is the clear distinction between
the roles of publishers and subscribers: only publishers can
write information in the cloud and the subscribers can read.
This fine-grained access control is introduced in the CBS
scheme by distributing different secret keys by the differ-
ent players of the system. Observe that (in provable secure
CBS schemes) a subscriber can never write valid informa-
tion in the cloud without the associated encryption-signing
secret key (because the signature generated at encryption
time must be unforgeable) and (such as in the standard
public key encryption schemes) publishers can never read
information from the cloud without the associated decryp-
tion/verification key.
4. THE SCHEME
The simple CBS scheme we propose makes use of bilinear
maps. We start the description of the proposed scheme by
first introducing this concept.
Bilinear maps.
Let G and GT be two cyclic groups of order p (the order
of the groups depends of the security parameter η), P the
generator of G, and eˆ : G×G→ GT an admissible symmetric
bilinear map, where the following properties hold:
• Bilinearity: ∀P,Q ∈ G. eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab;
• Non-degenerate: eˆ(P, P ) 6= idGT (i.e., not all the pairs
in G×G map to identity in GT );
• Efficiently computable: ∀P,Q ∈ G there is an efficient
algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q).
As in [3], the modified Weil and Tate pairings are admissi-
ble applications, where G is a cyclic subgroup of an additive
group defined by a supersingular elliptic curve E(Fp) and
GT is a multiplicative cyclic subgroup of a finite extension
of Fp. More details on bilinear maps can be found in [17].
Description.
The proposed CBS scheme is composed by four polynomial-
time algorithms:
Setup(η) Given the security parameter η ∈ Z+ the algo-
rithm works as follows:
1. Generate a prime number p (which depends of η),
two cyclic groups G,GT of order p, and an admis-
sible symmetric bilinear map eˆ : G × G → GT as
described above. Choose a random generator P
of G.
Figure 2: Content-based security for C-DAX
2. Pick a random t and b in F∗p (notation: t, b←$ F∗p)
as master secret keys:
• t is the decryption-verification master secret
key
• and b is the encryption-signing master secret
key
such that t 6= b and set T = tP and B = bP as
associated master public keys.
3. Choose three cryptographic hash functions as fol-
lows:
• H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗,
• H2 : GT → {0, 1}∗,
• H3 : {0, 1}∗ ×G→ F∗p.
The message space is M = {0, 1}∗ and the ciphertext
space is C = {0, 1}∗ × G∗ × G∗ × {0, 1}∗. The public
parameters are:
params = (H1, H2, H3,G,GT, eˆ, P, T,B, p).
KeyGen(params, idA, t, b) Given the identifier IDA ∈ {0, 1}∗
of topic A, the decryption-verification key is simply
dA = tQA and the encryption-signing key is bA = bQA,
where QA = H1(IDA) is the public key of topic A.
Encrypt(params, bA, idA,m) To publish (encrypt and sign)
a message m ∈ M on topic IDA, the algorithm exe-
cutes the following steps3:
QA ← H1(IDA)
a←$ F∗p
k ← eˆ(QA, T )a
R← aP
c← m⊕H2(k)
h← H3(c||IDA, R)
S ← (a+ h)−1 · bA
Output: the algorithm outputs the tuple (c,R, S, IDA).
Decryption(params, dA, CT ) To decrypt/verify a cipher-
text CT = (c,R, S, IDA) ∈ C the algorithm executes
3As usual k ←$ F∗p denotes: choose a random k in F∗p and
c||IDA denotes the concatenation of c and IDA.
the following steps:
h← H3(c||IDA, R)
V ← eˆ(R+ hP, S)
k ← eˆ(dA, R)
m← c⊕H2(k)
Thenm is accepted as a valid message iff V = eˆ(B,QA).
Note that the scheme is consistent since:
eˆ(QA, T )
a = eˆ(QA, tP )
a = eˆ(tQA, aP ) = eˆ(dA, R)
eˆ(R+ hP, S) = eˆ(aP + hP, S)
= eˆ((a+ h)P, (a+ h)−1bA)
= eˆ(P, bQA) = eˆ(B,QA).
This signcryption scheme results from the composition of
two existing schemes. It directly derives from the Boneh-
Franklin identity-based encryption scheme [3] and is an
adaptation of the McCullagh-Barreto identity-based signa-
ture scheme [16].
An important observation is that encryption of a message
m can be done using any symmetric cipher which takes as
input a message m ∈ {0, 1}n and a key k ∈ {0, 1}n for
some predefined length n (when considering M = {0, 1}n,
C = {0, 1}n × G∗ × G∗ × {0, 1}∗ and H2 : GT → {0, 1}n).
Nevertheless, the use of symmetric ciphers might affect the
performance of the proposed protocol.
The proposed scheme and C-DAX .
Figure 3 shows how the proposed scheme can be used to
enforce end-to-end security (end-to-end confidentiality and
integrity) in C-DAX. After running the setup algorithm, the
security server has to distribute the public parameters (PPa-
rams) to C-DAX clients and nodes4. Then it generates the
publishing (i.e., encryption-signing) and subscribing (i.e.,
decryption-verification) keys for each topic. The publish-
ing key bA of topic A is given to the authorised publishers
and the corresponding subscribing key dA to the authorised
subscribers 5.
4All C-DAX clients and nodes need to have a valid copy of
the public parameters, since invalid copies can jeopardise
the security of the system.
5Topic secret keys have to be securely distributed, but this
can be seen as an orthogonal problem and we do not address
it in this work.
Figure 3: CBS scheme applied to C-DAX infrastructure
To publish, each publisher creates an encryption c (de-
noted as {topic−data}k) of the topic data using topic’s pub-
lic key and generates a valid signature S using bA. Then the
publisher outputs the ciphertext (c,R, S, IDA) and sends it
to the C-DAX cloud. The cloud can authenticate the message
(i.e., verify that it came from an authorised publisher) re-
ceived from the publisher by computing QA = H1(IDA) and
h = H3(c||IDA, R), and verifying if eˆ(R+hP, S) = eˆ(B,QA).
Since the value of eˆ(B,QA) is always constant for all the
topic-data on topic A, it can be pre-computed and stored at
the node. If verification succeeds, the cloud can forward the
message to the intended subscribers. Upon receiving topic-
data, the subscriber first verifies if the signature S is valid
and then decrypts c using the subscribing key dA.
5. SECURITY
This section considers the security of the proposed scheme.
We start by articulating the security properties that a sign-
cryption scheme has to satisfy.
5.1 Security properties
A standard signcryption scheme must satisfy the security
properties of both encryption and signature schemes:
• Confidentiality – it should not be possible for an adap-
tive attacker to recover the plaintext from the cipher-
text without knowing the receiver’s private key;
• Unforgeability – an adaptive attacker is not able to
forge a valid signature without the knowledge of the
sender’s private key;
• Authentication/Non-repudiation – the sender cannot
deny his/her signcrypted ciphertexts;
• Integrity – the receiver can verify that the message
received was not modified;
• Public verifiability – any third party can verify the va-
lidity (i.e., authenticity) of the signcrypted ciphertext.
The standard way to prove that an asymmetric scheme
satisfies the confidentiality and unforgeability properties is
to prove that it is chosen ciphertext secure and existen-
tially unforgeable against adaptive attacks6. Simply put,
chosen ciphertext security for IBE systems considers an at-
tacker who is able to adaptively choose the keys of identi-
ties he/she wishes to attack. Intuitively, an attacker is go-
ing to be challenged on identities of his/her choice and the
scheme is chosen-ciphertext secure if given two messages and
a ciphertext encrypted/signed under an identity of his/her
choice, he/she is not able to discriminate which message cor-
responds to the ciphertext.
A scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable under
adaptively chosen-message attacks if the attacker, having ac-
cess to message-signature pairs of messages of his/her choice
encrypted and signed under keys of identities of his/her
choice, is not able to create a valid signature for a mes-
sage of his/her interest. Authentication, non-repudiation,
and integrity are satisfied if it is possible to prove that no
one, apart the owner of the secret key, is able to forge a valid
signature of a message of his/her interest. By proving that
the scheme is existentially unforgeable, we also prove that
the scheme satisfies these properties. Detailed definitions of
chosen-ciphertext security and existential unforgeability of
the original schemes are available at [3, 16].
5.2 Security evaluation
The security of cryptographic protocols usually relies on
the difficulty of solving what is believed to be hard compu-
tational problems. In particular, the security of the scheme
proposed relies on the intractability a few computational
problems:
1. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): For
a, b, c ∈ F∗p given P, aP, bP ∈ G compute abP ∈ G, for
G of order p.
2. Inverse Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (Inv-
CDHP): For a ∈ F∗p, given P, a−1P ∈ G, compute aP ,
for G of order p. The Inv-CDHP is polynomial-time
equivalent to CDHP [22].
6In adaptive attacks, an attacker can adapt his/her queries
according to the previous ones [18].
3. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) For a, b, c ∈
F∗p given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G compute eˆ(P, P )abc, for
eˆ : G × G → GT an admissible bilinear map as de-
scribed above and G and GT of order p.
4. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDHP)
For a, b, c ∈ F∗p, given P, aP, bP, cP, z ∈ G decide whe-
ther eˆ(P, P )abc = z or not.
The proof of security is a reductionist security proof in
the random oracle model [18] and it proves that it satis-
fies chosen-ciphertext security and existential unforgeability.
Essentially, it considers the existence of random instances of
DBDHP and Inv-CDHP problems (i.e., considers random
(P, aP, cP, cP, z) and (P, a−1P ), respectively) and simulates
the hash functions (H1, H2 and H3) as random oracles.
We must also emphasise that the proposed CBS scheme
satisfies public verifiability, since signature verification only
relies on public parameters. Recall that the sender generates
a signature S of the encrypted message and signature verifi-
cation only requires the ciphertext (c,R, S, IDA), the master
public key B, and the topic public key QA. The hash value
h can be obtained from H3 on input (c||IDA, R), since H3 is
publicly known.
6. PERFORMANCE AND SYSTEM EVAL-
UATION
Performance-wise this scheme is comparable to the Bon-
eh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) [4] signature scheme for signature
verification. As in the BLS scheme our scheme only requires
the computation of one pairing (the most expensive oper-
ation) to validate a signature. The signcryption algorithm
requires 1 exponentiation, 1 inversion, and 2 multiplications,
and the unsigncryption requires 2 pairings and 1 multiplica-
tion, since the pairings eˆ(QA, T ) and eˆ(B,QA) can be pre-
computed and stored until the topic public key expires. As
pointed out in [3], the performance of the encryption algo-
rithm is comparable to the performance of ElGamal encryp-
tion in F∗p. On the other hand, unsigncryption is the most
expensive part of the protocol.
Revocation of public keys can be done as suggested in
[3]. Essentially, the validity of a public key is attached to
its identifier, i.e., the topic public key is the topic-identifier
concatenated with expiration date (e.g., the topic-public key
is topic-name || date). Every time a public key expires a
new secret key must be generated and distributed. In this
particular case, key update (if the master secret keys were
not compromised) only requires two multiplications. The
advantage over a PKI is that there is no need to get new
certificates every time a key is revoked, since the public key
can be locally computed.
An interesting feature of the proposed protocol is that it
can be used to enforce end-to-end security at different smart
grid domains with dedicated private-key generators (i.e. C-
DAX security servers) issuing keys to local clients. For in-
stance, if each distributed network operator (DNO) has its
own PKG, they can still communicate using the same C-
DAX cloud, as long as the public parameters used to vali-
date topic-data authenticity in the cloud are distributed in
advance. In this case, the DNO has the freedom to specify
local access control policies for each client and distribute the
topic-keys accordingly. Permissions to publish or subscribe
in the C-DAX cloud are then defined locally by the DNO and
these are unknown to the cloud (i.e., the cloud is not aware
of the access control policies that it is actually enforcing).
Another kind of fine-grained access control mechanism can
be supported in the proposed CBS scheme by attaching at-
tributes to the topic-public keys, i.e., the topic-public key
is not just a name, but the name and a set of attributes.
Clients allowed to publish/subscribe information about such
topics have to hold the associated secret keys. Notice that
in this case, even if all the clients are able to encrypt topic-
data (since it is done using the topic public-key), only the
ones holding the publishing key (which provides a valid sig-
nature of the encrypted data) can actually publish it in the
C-DAX cloud. The same happens when subscribing: only
the subscribers holding a valid subscribing key can decrypt
topic-data encrypted under a set of attributes.
7. RELATED WORK
Zhang et. al [23] were the first to adapt the identity-based
cryptography schemes to information-centric networks. Their
model also considers the unique identifier as being the content-
name (topic-name) instead of the entity name. For scalabil-
ity reasons, the authors propose a protocol that combines
PKI and IBE. The PKI is used to guarantee the authentic-
ity of the public parameters of different domains (e.g., pub-
lic key generators of different organisations): the publisher
sends the public parameters signed with its private key and
the subscriber can verify the authenticity by using the cor-
responding public key certificate. The IBE and IBS are used
for end-to-end security. The authors implemented the pro-
posed scheme on a location-based application for Android
devices. They concluded that to encrypt topic-data the per-
formance of pairing-based protocols is roughly comparable
to using RSA.
The approach of Zhang et. al is more general than ours
since it aims at giving an IBE solution for multi-purpose
information-centric networks, while the scheme proposed tar-
gets specific needs of the C-DAX project. Recall that the C-
DAX architecture considers the existence of nodes that can
store, cache or replicate topic-data; the role of the cloud
is not only forwarding data from publishers to subscribers,
but the C-DAX cloud is also able to perform content-authen-
tication. Besides, unlike Zhang et. al, in the proposed paper,
key and public parameters distribution are seen as orthogo-
nal problems and can be done in many different ways. For
example, security parameters can be distributed oﬄine (say
when equipment is rolled out in the field) or even as it is sug-
gested in [23], depending on the particular setting in which
C-DAX is used.
In order to provide some kind of content integrity, Smet-
ters et. al [20] proposed a model based on self-certifying
names which essentially ties the security of the content to
the trust in the host. The publisher chooses a user-friendly
name (for the content) and ties it to the content through a
digital signature. A disadvantage of this approach is that
subscribers have to hold all the certificates of all publishers
whose messages they want to be able to validate.
Kim et. al [8, 9] have proposed two protocols (in two in-
dependent papers) for securing information-centric networks
similar to the one envisioned in C-DAX, which we partially
discussed in Section 2.3. The SSTP protocol [8] aims at en-
forcing confidentiality and integrity and it is based on pre-
shared symmetric keys and state-tokens. The pre-shared key
is used to establish a session key (using the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol) between two clients. The state-token
is used to avoid storage of the session state (including the
session key). This protocol provides lower security guaran-
tees, as pointed out before at Section 2.3. Additionally, a
limitation is that it does not provide end-to-end security be-
tween publishers and subscribers: the cloud, to be able to
authenticate topic-data, needs to know the pre-shared key,
and can then spoof the messages.
The REMP protocol [9] is an end-to-end protocol to pro-
vide confidentiality and integrity and relies on diversified
symmetric keys. Subscribers hold a (symmetric) master key
associated to the topic and publishers hold a key derived
from that master key and the publisher identity. Upon re-
ceiving the topic-data, each subscriber has to derive such
key to be able to verify the message authentication code of
the message and decrypt the topic-data. Authentication in
the cloud is similar to authentication in the Kerberos proto-
col and is based on access-tickets. Although REMP is more
robust than SSTP, it also has some limitations: its main
disadvantage is the fact that it is vulnerable to replay at-
tacks and the mechanism to mitigate this problem – nodes
checking for repeated messages – is not really scalable.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a content-based signcryption proto-
col for information-centric networks such as the one adopted
in the C-DAX project. Although it is a theoretical protocol
(i.e. not yet implemented and tested in the field), it presents
several advantages when compared to earlier proposals [8, 9].
First of all, it enforces end-to-end integrity and confidential-
ity between the clients and provides a fine-grained access
control at publishing/subscribing level: to each topic public
key are associated two secret keys, one for publishing and
another one for subscribing. Because the proposed scheme is
publicly verifiable, the cloud can authenticate all the topic-
data published by the clients, without knowing the secret
keys and without any additional authentication tokens cre-
ated by the publisher. The memory usage required to store
the public parameters necessary for content-authentication
is minimal and constant. The protocol targets the specific
needs of the communication model adopted in the C-DAX
project, but is not limited to this.
Directions for future work.
Although the solution proposed already tackles some of
the problems that arise when developing protocols to secure
information-centric networks, several issues still remain. For
instance, it is not clear in the proposed protocol how to deal
with re-keying when clients join or leave a topic, i.e., when
a client leaves a topic and is no longer allowed to publish or
read messages on it, or when a client joins a topic but is not
allowed to read old messages. Recall that in the proposed
protocol, all the topic keys are derived from the same master
secret keys. A solution would be to generate master secret
keys for each topic, to avoid replacing all the topic keys
when a client joins or leaves a specific topic. Still, it is
not clear if this solution scales and we leave it as future
work. A desirable feature would be to have different secret
keys per client for topic secret keys, i.e., different publishing
and subscribing keys per client for each topic. This would
avoid the need of re-keying all the clients (either publishers
or subscribers) when only one client is compromised (or is
leaving or joining a topic).
A drawback of the proposed CBS scheme and of IBE
schemes in general is that the PKG controls the entire sys-
tem, and thus is a single point of failure. It would be in-
teresting to study how to overcome this problem. It might
be possible to apply the concepts underlying certificateless
signcryption [2] where the secret key escrow functionality is
removed. Another important aspect that must be addressed
in the future is to evaluate if the system scales when the
number of topics grows linearly in time. This is going to be
useful for some use cases, namely the retail market use case,
where a dynamic creation of topics is expected.
The major disadvantage of the proposed CBS scheme is
that it exhibits weak resilience against exposure of publish-
ing keys to external parties. For example, if a publisher
is compromised, anybody can be disguised as a legitimate
publisher of a particular topic group. A possible solution to
overcome this issue could be based on the concepts underly-
ing Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption (HIBE) [7], by
giving different publishing keys (derived from a single pub-
lishing master key) to each publisher within a topic group.
For instance, the publishing key could be derived from the
master publishing key and the unique identifier of each pub-
lisher. The problem of such approach is that the act of
publishing cannot be anonymous anymore: to be able to
verify the signature, every subscriber and the cloud itself
have to know the publisher’s identity. This means that pub-
lisher’s identifiers have to be attached in the clear (i.e., un-
encrypted) to the topic-message. Investigating how to cope
with this issue is left as future work.
We also plan to investigate possibilities for privacy-friendly
aggregation or filtering of encrypted data. This is inter-
esting in use cases that involve privacy-sensitive data (e.g.,
metering data of an individual household or data from elec-
tronic vehicles) and commercially sensitive data (e.g., price
offers). Privacy-friendly solutions for aggregration have al-
ready been proposed for the smart grid [6, 13]. In the C-
DAX architecture the nodes are an obvious location, with
the required computing resources, for carrying out such ag-
gregation or filtering.
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